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Abstract. In this paper we propose a distinguishing attack on CryptMT, one of 
the ECRYPT stream cipher candidates, which needs 2
50 bits of the output se-
quence with the same computational complexity. This is the first attack on this 
cipher. 
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1   Introduction 
Stream ciphers are widely used for fast encryption of sensitive data. Lots of old 
stream ciphers that have been formerly used can no longer be considered secure, be-
cause of their vulnerability to newly developed cryptanalysis techniques. In particular, 
the NESSIE project [1] did not select any of the proposed stream ciphers for its port-
folio, as it was felt that none of the submissions was sufficiently strong. In order to 
create a portfolio of secure stream ciphers, the ECRYPT project [2] made a call for 
designs of new stream ciphers which led to submission of 35 proposals to the project 
by April 2005.  
In [3] two stream ciphers called CryptMT and Fubuki has been proposed as 
ECRYP stream cipher [2] candidates. CryptMT is very simple but with a huge 
amount of internal state. It works with 32-bit words and produces an 8-bit byte in 
each step. The key and IV of the cipher accept any length up to 2048 bits (64 words). 
One of the generic attacks on stream ciphers is distinguishing attack whose aim is to 
distinguish the output sequence of a given stream cipher from a purely random se-
quence, with small error probability, faster than exhaustive search of the key space. In 
this paper we show that the LSB’s (Least Significant Bits) of every two consecutive 
output bytes are equal with probability ½(1 + 2
-24) which shows that the output se-
quence of CryptMT is distinguishable from a purely random one using about 2
50 bits 
with the same computational complexity. Both kinds of error probability of the distin-
guisher are about 0.15. 
2   Outline of CryptMT 
The main part of CryptMT is the so-called MT (Mersenne Twister) generator, a linear 
finite state machine with 19937 bits internal state. The output sequence of MT has pe-
riod equal to 2
19937 – 1 and produces a 32-bit word in each step. The initial state of MT is determined thorough a specified key-IV set up. Then the accumulative product of 
the output sequence of MT is computed modulo 2
32. The initial value of the accumu-
lator is set to a non-zero value determined by the key-IV set up. The LSB of the MT 
output word is set to one before multiplication with the accumulator to ensure that the 
content of the accumulator will not be zero. The 8 most significant bits of the accu-
mulator is considered as one byte of the output sequence of CryptMT. Let denote the 
output sequence of MT, the state sequence of the accumulator and the output se-
quence of CryptMT itself by  ,   and   respectively, where 
and  . A complete description of CryptMT can be given 
by the following recursive equations 
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for  where the symbols &, ⊕, | and >> denote bitwise AND, XOR, OR and right-
shift operations of 32-bit words. The symbol × denotes multiplication modulo 2
0 ≥ t
32 and 
the constants c1 to c4 are defined by: c1 = 0x00000001, c2 = 0x9908b0df, c3 = 
0x7fffffff and c4 = 0x80000000. The expression “mod 256” has been used to empha-
sis that  .The initial values of   and   are determined thorough a 
certain key-IV set up. The size of the key and the size of IV are up to 2048 bits (64 
words). The designers have not directly claimed any security level for the cipher, but 
it seems that the cipher has been designed to provide 256 bits of security [4]. 
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3   Description of the Attack 
In this section we present our distinguishing attack on CryptMT. We assume that 
 and  , the MT output sequence and the accumulator state sequence, are 
uniformly distributed. We define 128 32-bit integers u
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0, u1, …., u127 where uk = k2
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k j r r k u A 7 1 ≤ ≤ j . In other 
words Aj ( ) contains all 32-bit integers which their first and (33-j) 7 1 ≤ ≤ j
th LSB is 
one, the (j–1) MSB’s are arbitrary and the rest 31–j bits are all zero. For every 
( j A u∈ 7 0 ≤ ≤ j ), the 8 most significant bits of  and  are the same in the 8–j 
LSB’s and can be either different or the same in the rest j MSB’s. It is easy to show 
that for every  ( ), the probability that the 8 most significant bits of   
and  are the same is equal to 2
t p u pt ×
j A u ∈ 7 0 ≤ ≤ j t p
u pt ×
-j provided that   is uniformly distributed. 
Moreover, the probability that w
t p
t | c1 be equal to each one of the uk’s is equal to 2
-31 
for  . If the value of w 127 0 ≤ ≤ k t | c1 is not equal to none of the uk’s, the probability 
that the most significant 8 bits of   and  are the same is equal to 2 t p k t u p ×
-8. Using 
the Total Probability Theorem, it can be inferred that zt and zt+1 are equal with           
  2probability (1×2
-31)×1 + (1×2
-31)×1/2 + (2×2
-31)×1/4 + … + (64×2
-31)×1/128 + (1– 
128×2
-31)2
-8 = 2
-8 + 2
-29; note that |A0| = 1 and  for 
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j A 7 1 ≤ ≤ j . This bias can 
be detected using 2
52 bytes (2
55 bits) of the output sequence with error probability of 
about 0.15. The required computational complexity is O(2
52). 
The data and time complexities can be reduced if we focus on the LSB of the out-
put bytes of the CryptMT generator sequence. It is easy to verify that the LSB of the 8 
most significant bits of   and  , or equivalently the 25 t p k t u p ×
th LSB of them, are the 
same for each and . If the value of w t p 127 0 ≤ ≤ k t | c1 is not equal to none of the uk’s, 
the probability that the 25
th LSB of   and  are the same is equal to ½. Again 
using the Total Probability Theorem, the LSB of z
t p k t u p ×
t and zt+1 are equal with probability 
128×2
-31 + ½ (1 – 128×2
-31) = ½(1 + 2
-24).  This bias can be detected using 2
50 bits of 
the output sequence with error probability of about 0.15. The required computational 
complexity is O(2
50). 
4   Conclusion 
In this paper we mounted a distinguishing attack on CryptMT, one of the ECRYPT 
stream cipher candidates. The result shows that the output sequence of this cipher is 
distinguishable from a purely random one using 2
50 bits of the output sequence with 
the same computational complexity. The possibility of turning this distinguisher to a 
key-recovery attack remains an open problem. 
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